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AN ECHO FROM THE SCOPES TRIAL
The writer of this article would have been glad to let
the evolution or "Monkey trial" of Tennessee pass by without notice and become ancient history.
But the press of
the country and individuals seem to think otherwise. For
example here is a head liner from a recent publication: "The religious world is being split wide open by feverish
controversies over the most fundamental elements of Christian faith and the facts of modern science. Churches have
been divided and pastors have been forced to resign by the
irreconcilable conflict. In the courts of Tennessee a furious
legal battle has been and is being fought between lawyers
and scientists of national prominence over the evolutionary
origin and the Biblical story of man's creation." The New
York Times says "All over this land, and in Europe as well,
millions of people are amazingly aroused by religious passion because of this trial. Similar conflicts are threatened
in other states and even in the Congress of the United
States." At the meeting of the American Bar Association
last summer an address was delivered by a very prominent
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ex-jurist of the United States Supreme Court in which indirectly he criticises the action of legislatures and courts in
restricting and hampering knowledge. It is so plain that
the speaker was alluding to the legislature and courts of
Tennessee that "he who runs may'read though he were a
fool." Here are the words of the Hon. Charles Evans
Hughes, the speaker referred to: "If progress has taught
us anything, it is the vital need of freedom in learning. Perhaps this is the most precious privilege of liberty - the
privilege of knowing, of pursuing untrammeled the paths
of discovery, of inquiry, of invention. And like other privileges of liberty, it is not one to be reserved to a few. It
belongs to all, and the only protection for all is that it does
belong to all and that society is thus assured its full benefit.
Yet it is with respect to the freedom of learning that
we find a disposition to impose restrictions which fail to
give us grave concern.
Believing as I do that the freedom of learning is the
vital breath of democracy and progress, I trust that a recognition of its supreme importance will direct the hand of
power and that our public schools and state universities
may enjoy the priceless advantage of courses of instruction designed to promote the acquisition of all knowledge
and may not be placed under restrictions to prevent it; and
that our teachers may be encouraged to know and to teach
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This
is the path of salvation of men and democracy."
The above remarks of Mr. Hughes called forth the following strong editorial from one of the great dailies of
America, the Philadelphia Inquirer, entitled "Ominous
Signs of the Times." We give verbatim the editorial. "The
address of Mr. Hughes before the American Bar Association at Detroit should not go unread by any intelligent citizen. It has the lucidity, the logical force and the breadth
of view which we learned to expect from the former Justice
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of the Supreme Court and Secretary of State. The subject
of the address is not new; but seldom has it been discussed
with so much cogency. Mr. Hughes finds in the growth of
an intolerant spirit "the most ominous sign of our times."
Sometimes this spirit finds its expression in public opinion;
sometimes, even more fatally, in law. The tyranny of a
minority may suffice, to force legislation repugnant to the
majority. Our institutions, says Mr. Hughes, were not devised to bring about uniformity of opinion; if they had
been, we might well abandon hope.
Yet this attempted regulation of belief as well as conduct goes on regardless of the true principle of liberty,
which is, in Mr. Hughes' words, 'that under its shelter
many different types of life and character and opinion and
belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.' Enforced
conformity is always dangerous. 'The interests of liberty,'
Mr. Hughes reminds us, 'are peculiarly those of individuals.'
Thus revolutions, as in France and Russia, have proved
fatal in the end of liberty because they have ignored the
rights of individuals. The communistic scheme is in its
essence despotic; and even democracy, to quote Mr.
Hughes again, 'has its own capacity for tyranny.'
The multiplicity of legal enactments infringing on the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights and the rapid growth of
bureaucracy are danger signs that should be heeded.
Coming to a question of immediate significance, Mr.
Hughes emphasizes the need of the freedom of learning,
which many seek to hamper with restrictions. 'Of what
value is government', he asks, 'if it puts research under
'ban'? No less perilous is the intervention of the state in
the dogmas of religion. Full liberty in this respect was always the American ideal. How long will it outlast the
plausible contention that the truth of religion must be fostered and supported by the State? 'Some of the saddest
pages of history,' Mr. Hughes remarks, 'come from that
pretext.' Yet the sincerity of those who would destroy the
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body in order to save the soul was not open to question.
Intolerance is by its nature sincere.'
The signs and portents" which a man of commanding
intellect finds ominous should not be lightly dismissed in
our casual American way. The evils he deplores have
grown because we failed to grapple with them. It is true
that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."
The above address and editorial called forth this article. And to begin with we wish to state our disagreement with both the address and the editorial on the subjects of "ominous signs," "tyranny of law", tyranny of
democracy," "intolerance," etc. The editor of the Inquirer
says that "the signs and portent which a man of commanding intellect finds ominous should not be lightly dismissed
in our casual American way." It is true that Mr. Hughes
is a commanding figure with a commanding intellect. He
was once Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court and Secretary of State, Gov. of New York and once
placed on high as a candidate for the highest office in the
gift of the greatest nation on this planet. But we must not
forget that Mr. Hughes is balanced on the other side of this
question by another commanding personality just as high
in qualities, the late Mr. William Jennings Bryan, ex-Congressman, once Secretary of State, three times a candidate
for the same high place as Mr. Hughes sought. Besides, for
years Mr. Bryan fought for righteousness with voice and
pen till he was regarded the greatest lay-preacher of the
age and defender of the Faith. He saw no "ominous signs"
"intolerance", "tyranny of democracy." He saw these
on the other side of the question. He saw tyranny of
wrong, ominous signs of an impending crash of the social
structure because of wickedness. He saw more danger in
the use of license to attack the Word of God and religion
in the guise of liberty than in defending these from those
attacks. To our way of thinking Mr. Hughes' address is
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most unfortunate and injurious to the cause of religion and
the Bible and more so because coming from such a source.
The American public could reasonably expect a different
stand from such a high class churchman as Mr. Hughes.
The moving spirit and we might say, the propelling spirit
in the defence at Scope's trial was and is a national society,
having for its object the eliminating of all Bible reading
and religious teaching in school or college, or public institution, prayer from political meetings and legislative halls,
and all religious teaching and preaching whatsoever. That
society, The American Civil Liberties Union, would transform this nation and the world to atheism and paganism.
It is back of all these attacks against religion and Christianity. It employed the greatest advocate of its system,
Clarence Darrow, to defend Scopes,. If Mr. Hughes desires
to be placed in the category of aiding and giving comfort
to the enemies of God and His religion, he is welcome to
the role.
Now, we revert to some of the arguments. Mr. Hughes
pleads for the "freedom to learn" and "that our schools and
state universities may enjoy the priceless advantage to promote the acquisition of all knowledge and may not be placed under restrictions to prevent it; and that our teachers
may be encouraged to know and to teach the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth." Now, any honest
man can subscribe to that statement. But, who is the referee or umpire to settle what is the truth in respect to the
issue in dispute---the origin of man? Mr. Hughes will contend that Mr. Scopes knows what the truth is on this question and having ascertained what it is, should be free and
unhampered to teach this truth which he has discovered, to
the young people of a sovereign state, and that sovereign
state should not take steps to restrict and prevent him
from so doing.
Now, we contend that so far as the scientific world is
concerned this subject matter is still a mooted question.
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Science finds that the lowest form of animal organism is
confined to a single simple thing. Then there are complex
things, more complex, and most complex things in one continuous line from the lowest to the highest order of animal
life. At one end of the line is the single, simple, infinitesimal cell called the amoeba, at the other end is placed man,
consisting of a multiplicity of cells. All other forms of animal organisms fall in between. Some one has said that
as soon as Darwin propounded the results of his
cell discoveries, a whole tribe of conclusion-jumpers arose.
Pseudo-scientists multiplied after their kind, and, also, scientists themselves, in some cases became conclusion jumpers. But Thomas A. Huxley, a contemporary was immune
to the epidemic and recognized that Darwin had not
proved his case. It was still a theory and not a fact proved.
Science finds some skeletons that it claims are one hundred
thousand years old, more or less. These skeletons resemble
the skeletons of a modern ape, chimpanzee, gorrilla, baboon or monkey. Therefore man is the ascendant of this
pre-historic race of jungle inhabitants. This is the missing
link for which Darwin could not account to Huxley when
requested. How does science know?
Prof. Raymond Dart, of Witwaterstrand University,
just within the last year thought he had definitely found
the skull of the missing link in South Africa. Sir Arthur
Keith, of the Royal College of Surgeons, London, says "No
you are mistaken, Prof. Dart, your 'skull' belongs to the
present day anthropoid ape, gQrilla and chimpanzee." Sir
Arthur believes the skull is prehistoric and its owner lived
a million years ago. He contends that the "find"
throws light on the history of the anthropoid apes, but not
of man.
Why can't science just as reasonably, just.as logically
claim that this ape race descended from man as to say man
ascended from the ape? Such a theory is fully as logical,
fully as reasonable, and besides it has the merit of not being
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antagonistic to Holy Writ if not in harmony with it. The
Scriptures tell us that man fell by disobedience. The sins
of the parents are visited upon the children and the children's children, to the third and fourth generation. That
means a descent from higher to lower grade. It takes a
struggle to climb up in the scale of being. We have seen
cartoons of thugs from the underworld, yea, we have seen
the real things themselves that resembled these species of
lower animals mentioned above. They are degenerates;
some by their own acts; some by heredity and some by
both. Think, Mr. Reader, are you going to side with the
evolutionists, Mr. Darrow and Mr. Scopes and accept this
theory which is pure, downright speculation and not established truth? Or will you accept the word of God when it
says that "God took of the dust of the ground and formed
man and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and
man became a living soul. So God created man in his own
image, in the image of God created he him"? Mr. Scopes,
Darrow and Company would read something like this into
the Scriptures-"And the Lord God formed the ape of the
dust of the ground, and breathed into its nostrils the breath
of life, and ape became a living soul. So God created ape
in his own image, in the image of God created He it."
Again the Divine Book tells us that God "hath in these
last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds.
Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express
image of his person, and upholding all things by the word
of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat
down on the right hand of the Majesty on high."
Now, just as things that are equal to the same things
are equal to each other so are things and persons that are
like the same thing or person are like each other. If Jesus
Christ, the Son of God, is like the Father and His express
image, and became flesh and took the form of man, and man
was made in the image of God, and the ape, chimpanzee,
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baboon or monkey was that man, then that ape, chimpanzee, etc., and Christ looked alike for both are the image of
God. Mr. Scopes, Darrow and Company can not logically
escape this scandalous and blasphemous conclusion. And
this is some of the "truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth" that Mr. Hughes would have taught and learned
in the interest of "freedom to learn" by the young people
of this Christian nation.
But the pupils may say to Mr. Scopes and his like that
their parents do not teach them that way. "No difference,"
says this teacher. Neither does the Bible teach us that
way. "No difference," says this infallible master. "Our
Sunday School teachers and our ministers do not do so, either." "Your ministers, Sunday School teachers, your parents and your Bibles are all wrong." says the unmistaken
and unmistakable instructor of Tennessee. "I have the latest information on this subject. I am giving you the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth."
This theory of evolution is not a new thing.
It has been a theory for more than three hundred years and
was hinted at by ancient philosophers. In the early 16 hundreds it was advanced; it was more earnestly so in the 17
hundreds; and reached its height in the 19th century with
Mr. Darwin as its chief exponent. The years of this century have seen only its rehash, nothing added to it by way
of proof. It is unproved and unprovable by its very nature.
The frank confession that evolution has not made its
case is made by Dr. Henry Fairchild Osborn, in the preface
to his book "The Origin and Evolution of Life."
"In truth," says Dr. Osborn, "from the period of the
earliest stages of Greek thought man has been eager to discover some natural cause of evolution, and to abandon the
idea of supernatural intervention in the order of nature.
Between the appearance of the Origin of Species, in 1859,
and the present time, there have been great waves of faith
in one explanation and then in another; each of these waves
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of confidence has ended in disappointment until finally we
have reached a stage of very general skepticism. Thus the
long period of observation, experiment, and reasoning
which began with the French natural philosopher, Buffon,
150 years ago, ends with the general feeling that our search
for causes far from being near completion, has only just
begun." Dr. Osborn is an evolutionist and a great scientist.
In thus admitting failure he steps aside for the Bible account and says he has no quarrel with the supernaturalist.
Is there a dangerous'growth
of intolerance? Mr.
Hughes says there is an "ominous growth" of this spirit.
With the Federation of Churches in existence and functioning in all large cities in the land; Y. M. and Y. W. C. As.
all over the world where all denominations and people of
no denomination are welcome; Red Cross societies enlisting the energies of all faiths for charitable activities;
thousands of independent voters supporting good men on
one ticket then on another-more so than was ever known
in this country before; only a short time ago a great temperance meeting was held in Chicago where Protestant,
Catholic and Jew spoke from the same platform; a week
ago a Methodist congregation sent $1000 to a Catholic congregation to help rebuild a church destroyed by fire; on
Thanksgiving Day in Philadelphia Protestants and Jews assembled in commemoration of the day and both took part
in the service. In the. face of all this and much more, still
there is an "ominous growth" of intolerance. Where is it?
There are in truth in this country some churches which will
not permit ministers of another denomination to occupy
their pulpits. When was there a time in the history of
America when that was not the case? When the writer
was a boy he heard men say that they would rather vote for
the devil on their ticket than for an angel on the opposite
ticket. To the disappointment of many of us Mr. Hughes
just barely escaped entering the White House by a few
thousand votes in 1916. In 1920 Mr. Harding went in
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by five -or six million majority. Does not that indicate a
relaxing of intolerance?
We stated a moment ago that America was a religious
nation and a Christian people. This has been officially declared by the United States Supreme Court in 1844. In the
contested will case of Vidal vs. Girard's Executors, 43 U. S.
198, Justice Story says "all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship God according to the dictates of their
own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship * * * Language
more comprehensive for the complete protection of every
variety of religious opinion could scarcely be used; * * *
So that we are compelled to admit that although Christianity be a part of the common law of the state, yet it is
so in this qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are
admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public."
Again this doctrine was promulgated more emphatically on February 29, 1892, by the same court in Holy Trinity Church vs. United States, 143 U. S. 457. The decision
was handed down by Brewer, J., in a lengthy opinion in
which he cites early legal documents recognizing the Christian religion. Among these are the Commission to Christopher Columbus by Ferdinand and Isabella, of Spain; the
first colonial grant made to Sir Walter Raleigh by "Elizabeth, by the Grace of God, of England, France and Ireland,
queene, defender of the faith, etc." and the grant authorizing him to enact statutes for the government of
the proposed colony provided that, "they be not
against the true Christian faith nowe professed in
the Church of England."
The first charter of Virginia in 1606 by King James 1st, charters subsequently
given in 1609 and 1611 to the same colony and by the same
King are cited. The celebrated compact made by the Pilgrims in the Mayflower in 1620 was for the securing of lib-
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erty and establishing and preserving the Christian faith in
these parts of the world. The charter to Wm. Penn in 1701,
the Declaration of Independence, the constitutions of
Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York and Illinois, all go to
the same purpose as the foregoing.
In August, 1811, the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, 8 John 299 decided that blasphemy against God
and contumelious reproaches and profane ridicule of Christ
or the Holy Scriptures are offences punishable at the common law, whether uttered by words or writings. Wantonly,
wickedly and maliciously uttering the following (we give
the substance and not the exact words) Jesus Christ was an
illegitimate child and his mother must be a questionable
character, was held to be a public offence and punishable at
the common law in that state. The common law must be
quite intolerant according to Mr. Hughes. Wendel, counsel
for the accused, argued and contended that the offence
charged was not punishable by the law of New York although it was punishable by the law of England where
Christianity makes part of the law of the land. Chancelor
Kent rendered the opinion. He held that in the interest of
the State and the protection of the ploral discipilne and virtue which helps to bind society together the above opinion
was rendered. Note the words of the great Chancellor:"Nothing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of
the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of
the young, than to declare such profanity lawful. It would
go to confound all distinction between things sacred and
profane; for, to use the words of one of the greatest oracles
of human wisdom, (Bacon's Works) 'Profane scoffing doth
by little and little deface the reverence for religion', and who
adds in another place, 'two principal causes have I ever
known of atheism-curious controversies and profane
scoffing'."
But Mr. Hughes may say "you are begging the question. The New York case, we will agree was profane and
provoking and the court decided it rightly." Very well, we
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cite another. In 1824 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that Christianity is part of the common law of this
state and to say "that the Holy Scriptures were a mere
fable: that they were a contradiction, and that, although
they contained a number of good things, yet they contained a great many lies," was blasphemy to the great dishonor
of Almighty God, to the great scandal of the profession of
the Christian Religion, to the evil example of all others in
like case offending etc. 11 S.& R. 394.
Now, the words uttered on that occasion were spoken
before a deliberative assembly - a literary society for mutual benefit. Watkins, for the defendant, argued to the
court that the constitution of this state protects every citizen in the enjoyment and expression of his opinions on all
subjects provided he does not breach the peace; that the Act
of Assembly in 1700 is inconsistent with the constitution;
that it was a law passed a century before when enlightened
notions of the rights of man were not so universally diffused, as at this day when the spirit of the law gives freedom to
all, whether Christian, Jew or Mohammetan.
Here is the answer of Duncan, J., in rendering his
opinion: - "The bold ground is taken, though it has often
been exploded, and nothing but what is trite can be said
upon it - it is a barren soil, upon which no flower ever
blossomed; - the assertion is once more made, that Christianity never was received as a part of the law
of this Christian land; and it is added, that if it was, it was
virtually repealed by the constitution of the United States,
and of this state, as inconsistent with the liberty of the people, the freedom of religious worship, and hostile to the
genius and spirit of our government, and, with it, the act
against blasphemy; and if the argument is worth anything,
all the laws which have Christianity for their object - all
would be carried away at one fell swoop - the act against
cursing and swearing, and breach of the Lord's Day; the
act forbidding incestuous marriages, perjury by taking a
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false oath upon the book, fornication and adultery * * * *
for all these are founded on Christianity - for all these are
restraints upon civil liberty, according to the argument edicts of religious and civic tyranny, when enlightened notions of the rights of man were not so universally diffused
as at the present day."
How is that for intolerance just one hundred and one
years ago for doing no more than uttering one's opinions
in a deliberative body by way of debate? Intolerance today
cannot be compared with that court decision of a century
ago. Where then is the "ominous growth of intolerance?"
But once more, note the words of the Pennsylvania
Judge as a reason for the decision: - "Christianity is a
part of the common law of this state. It is not proclaimed
by any commanding voice of any human superior, but expressed in the calm and mild accents of customary law. Its
foundations are broad, and strong, and deep; they are laid
in the authority, the interest, the affections of the people.
Waiving all questions of hereafter, it is the purest system
of morality, the firmest auxiliary, and only stable support of
all human laws." And it is for the very reason as expressed
in this Judge's opinion that the state steps in with the exercise of the police power and says that "that only stable
support of all human laws" shall not be broken down; that
that "purest system of morality" shall not be honeycombed
with subtle falacies in the guise of liberty: that that "firmest auxiliary" to all human laws shall be maintained.
While it may not be contrary to the common law of
Tennessee to blaspheme the Diety or to revile and reproach
the Scriptures directly yet the legislature of the state in
the exercise of police power has made it a statutory offence to revile and reproach the Bible indirectly by forbidding the teaching of evolution which is contrary to the
Bible account of man's origin. The legislature thus says
that in the interest of society's welfare morally, in the interest of the public peace, this theory which is nothing
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more than conjecture, and speculation shall not be taught
to the children of the state where such teaching is paid for
by the state. The Tennessee legislature has not forbidden
the teaching of this theory in private schools or colleges,
though we think the police power could have been extended
even that far. But it did not see fit to do so. The legislature did not wish to have the source of the "purest morality, firmest auxiliary, and the only stable support" of the
laws of Tennessee undermined and weakened by a theory
that gives that source the lie. The young people of the
state being taught that the Biblical account of man's origin was a falsehood, it would be an easy step for them to
conclude that there were other lies in this source of the
"purest morals" and "only stable support of Tennessee
(aws." That second step being taken opens the way for a
third. Finally concluding that the source of law and the
"purest morals" being false and unsound, it is easy to go
the limit and show contempt for the laws themselves, and
God in Heaven knows there is enough contempt for all law,
human and divine, the world over without encouraging it.
Here are a few statistics furnished by the American
Bar Association which are the most astounding of any ever
known to America. During the past ten years the United
States alone furnished a record of 85,000 people who have
met death by the pistol, the knife, or other unlawful means.
In 1920, 9,000 murders were committed in this country. In
1921 the number increased to 9,500. That same year 1,445
robberies were committed in New York City, and 2,417 in
Chicago. In 1922 there were 260 murders in New York
City, and 137 in Chicago. While these figures were taken
from the statistics of only two large cities, it is fair to presume that the record of other cities is in the same proportion. Why all this crime? We do not believe it results
from intolerance or restricted liberty. These criminals
want freedom to do as they please. They want no law or
if there is law they have only contempt for it. Hear what
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our good President has to vay in his address before a congregational assembly. He does not see "ominous signs of
intolerance" because of restraining laws. Mr. Coolidge
says, "More law observance and more religion are needed
in this country. If there are any general failures in the enforcement of the law, it is because there have first been
general failures in the disposition to observe law. I can
conceive of no adequate remedy for the evils which beset
society except through the influences of religion."
The President is right. He visions religion, "pure and
undefiled" as the cure for the ills that beset us at this time,
and we have a right to presume that the Tennessee legislature had the same vision when it enacted the law forbidding the teaching of a doctrine or theory in which the enemies of religion and the Bible gloried.
Mr. Hughes is greatly distressed at the "intolerant
spirit" shown by the legislature of Tennessee. He laments
the "restrictions" put around "learning and teaching", but
not one word against the spirit of anarchy manifested by
the Tennessee school master. This teacher says to the children for whom the state provides means of an education,
"this law - I don't intend to obey." He says to the school
board and the state, "I am a free lance; I have the ability
to discriminate, I make convenient selections of the laws
which I will obey. The law which compels you to fulfill
your contract to pay me my salary when I have earned it,
I believe in and think should be obeyed, but I will not observe other laws only as it suits my fancy."
Mr. Hughes should have lectured on the "growing and
ominous signs of anarchy" in the world, and he would have
struck a popular cord. And on top of that, if he had administered a sound drubbing to the Tennessee school master for his unholy and ungodly and anarchistic example before his pupils, he would have served his country better and
did honor to God.
In conclusion we affirm that the settlers of this coun-
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try, the framers of the constitution of the United States
and the various states, desired to honor God just as much
as they desired freedom; they wanted religion fostered and
nourished just as much as they wanted liberty, and they
felt that, if they had no regard for God and religion, and
dishonored Him even by silence, He could find a way to deprive them of their cherished liberty. We have a right to
presume that the legislature of Tennessee was prompted
by the same high motive when it forbid the teaching of an
anti-Scriptural theory of the origin of the race, especially
where it is unproved, uncertain and chaotic.
Other nations have been destroyed for failure to honor
God. Some have been enslaved for not keeping the statutes
of Jehovah. His own chosen people, God did not hesitate
to chastise when they treated his statutes with contempt.
"Now consider this, ye that forget God, lest I tear you
in pieces, and there be none to deliver."-Psa. 50: 21, 22.
"Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that
put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put
bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter."-Isa. 5: 20.
ELLAHUE ANSILE HARPER.
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MOOT COURT
HICKS VS. ROLLINS
Promissory Note - Suit Against Endorser - Demand for Payment
of Negotiable Note Must Be Made on Day it Falls DueNotice of Non-payment - Proof of Notice Receipt of Notice - Liability of Endorser
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A executed a note for $1,000 payable to Hicks which Rollins en-

dorsed, it is alleged, for A's accommodation. This note was not paid
at maturity. This is a suit on the endorsement. Rollins denies (a)
that he ever received notice of the non-payment, (b) that such notice was sent him by mail or otherwise, (c) that demand was
made on A for payment at the maturity of the note. He asserts that
demand for payment was made on June 27th, whereas the note became payable on June 28th.
Scott, for Plaintiff.
Solway, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Clarke, J. The principal question to be decided in the present
case is, "Is the note negotiable?" If it was not negotiable, proof of
the meaning of the endorsement would have been necessary. The
Law Merchant has defined the obligations assumed by the endorsement of a negotiable bill or note, in the absence of evidence of a
varying undertaking: "An endorser is entitled to have demand made
upon the principal at maturity and to notice of the principal's default, unless he expressly waives them. His contract is not that he
will pay or that another will pay, but is conditional that he will pay
if the principal does not and his contract is made on the same paper
as the principal's is," Child's Suretyship and Guaranty, Page 11.
The note in question must be taken to be negotiable. The defendant would be liable as endorser, only if demand was made on
the maturity of this note, and notice of non-payment was immediately transmitted, McKinney vs. Crawford, 8 S. & R. 350.
The defence of the defendant that he had never received notice,
and that the plaintiff had failed to show that notice was given is a
good defence, Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 89.
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The other defence that demand had been made before maturity
and consequently in law was no demand at all, is upheld in Chestnut
Street National Bank vs. Ellis, 161 Pa. 244.
It is not necessary to consider the argument of the plaintiff as
it deals entirely with a non-negotiable note. Considering for a moment that the note might be a non-negotiable note, it is held by Pennsylvania authority that suit cannot be brought on a non-negotiable
note against one who merely endorses his name thereon; Miners
State Bank vs. Auksztokalnes, Admr. of Rosenberg, deceased, 283
Pa. 18.
In view of the foregoing conclusions of law the court hereby
enters a decree for the defendant with costs.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The court below has assumed, and properly, that the note in suit
was negotiable in form. Rollins endorsed it, to make it acceptable
to Hicks. Rollins became liable to Hicks, if the conditions on which
an endorser becomes liable have been fulfilled.
One of these conditions is that demand be made on the maker
for payment on the day of the note's maturity. That was June 28th.
The note was not due on June 27th. A demand on that day, was of
no value. The Neg. Inst. Act says, "Where the instrument is not
payable on demand, presentment must be made on the day it falls
due." Hence the endorser, the defendant, is discharged from his incipient and conditional liability.
Not to have received notice of the non-payment would not, ipso
facto, relieve the endorser. It would be necessary to inquire whether proper notice had been sent through the postoffice. The Act says,
"Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and deposited in the
Post Office, the sender is deemed to have given due notice notwithstanding any miscarrying by the mails." To escape payment, it must
appear that the endorser did not receive due notice of non-payment
and that proper notice was not dispatched to him through the post
office. Affirmed.
ROLAND VS. ROLAND
Wills

-

Devise of Real Estate -

Life Estate

-

Power to Sell

-

Schaaf vs. Politowski, 276 Pa. 31 Cited
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Roland devised to a cousin Harry a house and lot, "to
enjoy them during his life," and "I give him full power to sell them
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at a fair price in fee simple." Harry has occupied the house and lot
for nine years, never attempting to sell them. His son Charles claims
the property by descent from him. James, a son of William, claims,
in this ejectment, that he owns by descent, and that Harry took only
a life estate.
R. Garfinkle, for Plaintiff.
Goff, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Geistwhite, J. There is a well known characteristic of all will
cases, viz., that each case is a law unto itself and is decided so as to
give effect, if possible, to the testator's intention as disclosed by the
provisions of the instrument and the circumstances of the parties.
In the case at bar, the defendant's ancestor was given a freehold interest in a house and lot, to enjoy the use of them during his
life and with full power to sell them for a fair price in fee simple.
This presents the question; whether or not the addition of the power
of sale raised his interest to an estate of fee simple.
Where a life estate is expressly devised, and then a right of disposal of the same thing is given to the same person, the case of Smith
vs. Fulkinson, 25 Pa. 109, held that two ideas were intended to be expressed, as, for instance, an estate and a power. Applying this rule
to the facts of this case, it will follow that the testator would not be
giving a life estate to a person in a thing of which he was intending to grant an estate of fee simple.
The great majority of cases support the view that where an estate for life is given, with a power of disposition in fee simple of the
remainder annexed, the limitation for the life of the first taker will
control, and the life estate will not be enlarged to a fee, notwithstanding the power of the life tenant to dispose of the fee.
In the case of Fisher vs. Herbell, 7 W. & S., page 63, it was held
that a life estate only was given by the following facts: "It is my will
that all the .esidue of my estate, real and personal, I give and bequeath unto my wife during her natural life, to do and dispose of as
she may think best." This conclusion was carried through the great
majority of cases since that time, and was expressly held to be the
law in the case of McCullough's Estate, 272 Pa. 509.
Kennedy vs. Kennedy, 159 Pa. 327 held an heir-at-law was to be
disinherited only by an express devise or necessary implication. The
facts of this case show no such intention of the testator and it is
clearly shown that Harry Roland received only an estate for life
with a power of disposition, which he failed to exercise during his
life thereby having the estate revert to the plaintiff, James Roland,
as heir of Willian Roland. Numerous cases support this opinion,
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Hinkles' Appeal, 116 Pa. 490; Gross vs. Strominger, 178 Pa. 64;
Allen vs. Hurlinger, 219 Pa. 57; Walker's Estate, 277 Pa. 444.
For the various reasons we have recited, our decision is for the
plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The gift was to Harry, a cousin, of a house and lot, "to enjoy
them during his life," and "I give him full power to sell them at a
fair price in fee simple."
Without this clause giving the power to sell, the attribution to
the testator, of the intent to give his cousin a fee, would be inadmissible. The act providing that, even in the absence of words of
inheritance, the whole estate of the testator shall pass by his devise, requires that it shall not appear by a devise over, or by word&
of limitation or otherwise, that a limited estate was intended to pass.
We think the intention to give a limited estate sufficiently appears.
Adding to a life estate, a power to sell in fee simple, does not expand
the life estate into a fee.
Harry has died, not attempting to convey the house and lot. With
respect to them, after Harry's death, William Roland, the testator,
has died intestate. His son James takes them by inheritance. Charles
has no title. Cf. Schaaf vs. Politowski, 276 Pa. 31.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
MALCOLM VS. TOOLE
Decedents' Estates -

Decedents' Debts -

Lien for Debt -

Proceed-

ings to Keep Lien Alive - Time in Which Scire Facias
Must Be Issued - Act of May 3, 1909, P. L. 386Kirk vs. Van Horn, 265 Pa. 549, Approved
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X died leaving land, on Jan. 13, 1917. On Jan. 3, 1918, suit for
a debt of $5,000 was brought against his administrator. Judgment
in this suit was obtained on Jan. 1, 1923. Assuming that this prolonged the lien of the debt for five years, a sci. fa. to revive it, etc.,
was issued March 13, 1925, against the administrator and the heirs of
X. The heir, the plaintiff, contending that the debt has lost its lien,
asks for judgment in his favor. Judgment for the creditor, Toole, at
a sheriff's sale of the land, Toole is purchaser and takes possession.
This is ejectment by Malcolm, the heir.
Anchelewitz, for Plaintiff.
Barr, for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Baker, J. The Act of May 3, 1909, which was in force at the
time of decedent's death, provides as follows: "No debts of a decedent shall remain a lien on the real estate of such decedent longer
than two years after decease of debtor unless an action for recovery
thereof be brought against executor or administrator of such decedent ,and such action shall be indexed in the judgment index, etc.,
etc., and then to be a lien only for the period of five years after said
debt, etc., is filed and indexed, unless the same be revived by writ of
scire facias."
The question ivhich this court must determine is whether the five
year period begins to run from the time the action was begun or from
the rendition of judgment.
The plaintiff contends that the five year period runs from the
time the action was instituted. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff's argument is supported by the weight of authority in Pennsylvania.
The legislature enacted statutes of limitation such as the Act of
May 3, 1909, for the benefit of widows, heirs and devisees and those
claiming under them, as well as purchasers in order that their land
might be freed from the lien of debts unless the creditor brought his
action withii a certain limited period. To hold that the five year period commences from the time the judgment was rendered would defeat the purpose of the Act of May 3, 1909, because the time when the
scire facias must be issued would fluctuate according to the diligence
or tardiness of the creditor in prosecuting his action to final judgment, Kerper vs. Hoch, 1 Watts 9; Penn vs. Hamilton, 2 Watts 53;
Com. vs. Pool, 6 Watts 32; Duncan vs. Clark, 7 Watts 224; Greenough vs. Patton, 7 Watts 336; Con. to use vs. Beachley. 262 Pa. 545.
The defendant's position is untenable for the further reason that
the courts of Pennsylvania hold that the only effect of the judgment
is to prevent the lapse of the statutory lien and not to create a new
one, the lien of the debt continuing to the end of five years from and
after the date prescribed for the commencement of the action, whether judgment be recovered during the first or sceond period, Penn
vs. Hamilton, 2 Watts 53; Duncan vs. Clark, 7 Watts 224; Maus vs.
Hummell, 11 Pa. 228, 233; Corrigan's Estate, 82 Pa. 495; Hope vs.
Marshall, 96 Pa. 395.
We approve the decision in the case of Kirk vs. Van Horn et. al,
265 Pa. 549, which is directly in point with the case before us. Since
the defendant did not issue a sci. fa. within five years after he began
his suit, he thereby lost his lien and consequently derived no title to
the land under the sheriff's sale. The defendant, Toole, is therefore
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a trespasse.r and the plaintiff, Malcolm, must succeed in his action

of ejectment.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Suit within two years after the death of the debtor was necessary. Suit was brought. Suit to maintain the lien of the debt must
be brought within five years from the end of the two years. It was
not so brought. The death occurred Jan 13th, 1917. Judgment
against the administrator was obtained Jan. 1st, 1923. A suit making
the heirs as well as administrator parties, was begun March 13th,
1925, more than eight years after the .death of the.debtor. The law
requires it to be brought within seven years after death. The lien of
the debt had expired. There was no way of imparting resurrection
to it.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed. Toole obtained no title by his purchase at the execution sale. The title of
Malcolm, as heir, remains unimpaired. Affirmed.
GROOME VS. HALPIN
Wills

-

Devise of Life Estate With Remainder to One's Heirs
Rule in Shelly's Case, A Positive Rule of Law Provvision Against Alienation of No Effect

-

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Groome devised his farm, "to my son Henry. He shall not
sell or encumber it by mortgage or otherwise during his life time.
When he dies the same shall descend to his heirs." A creditor, Halpin, levied on the land as Henry's and became purchaser at sheriff's
sale. The plaintiff is the son of Henry Groome. This is ejectment
against Halpin who is in possession. The will further provided "in
construing this will the rule in Shelly's is to have no application. I
intend Henry to have a life estate."
Mundy, for Plaintiff.
Marks,, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Mirkin, J. The court here thinks that it is always good law in a
case involving a will to be governed by the testator's wishes when at
all possible. The testator here did not wish the rule in Shelly's case
to apply - and it is held in 211 Pa. 297, "That it is settled in our
cases that estate of inheritance in real estate given by a will may be
reduced to a lesser estate if the subsequent language of the instrument
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unequivocally shows such was the intention of the testator." This
clearly applies to this case and would defeat the rule in Shelly's
case. In 266 Pa. 477 the honorable court said, "When a testator in
the first instance uses language suitable to grant a fee simple, but
subsequent words immediately following in the devise indicate a
dominent intent to give a lesser estate the latter purpose will be upheld, 273 Pa. 505.
The counsel for defendant in the case holds the rule in Shelly's
case must apply as the law of Pa. and cites 233 Pa. 475 but this has
not been followed in Pennsylvania. and the modern cases hold that
the testators' wishes shall govern the cases.
The court finds for the plaintiff.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The land is given to Henry for life, and when he dies, it "shall
descend to his heirs." The direction not to encumber by mortgage
or otherwise, is ineffectual as being "an attempted restraint on alienation," Glenn vs. Stewart, 265 Pa. 208.
The application of the rule in Shelly's case is not dependant on
the consent of the grantor or testator. When a life estate is given
to X, with remainder to his heirs, nothing is given to the heirs, and
a fee is given to X. The rule operates, despite the intention of the
grantor or testator, that it shall not operate, 265 Pa. 208, supra.
The gift is to Henry for life. When he dies, the land is to "descend" to his heirs. Those who follow Henry are conceived as taking by descent, that is, as heirs.
The abrogation of a venerable rule of law would justify a more
thorough investigation than the opinion of the court below displays.
A fee being in Henry, it has passed by the sheriff's sale to Halpin. The judgment is reversed.
LOGAN VS. MATTOCK
Contract -

Meaning of Words

-

Established Custom May Be Used

In Interpreting Both Written and Oral Contracts

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Logan manufactures ferro-tungsten powder, which is used in
making steel, used in making cutlery. Mattock makes this steel.
Logan sold him 1000 lbs. of ferro-tungsten powder "free from copper,
tin, and other impurities." So said the written contract. The tungsten was delivered, but Mattock had an analysis made which showed
that it contained tin. He declines to pay for it. Suit for the price.
Logan, not denying the presence of some tin, alleges that absolute
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freedom from tin is not practicable and that the quantity of tin in
the article did not impair Mattock's product, and that in the trade
absolute freedom from tin was not meant by the stipulation against
tin, but only freedom from so much tin as impaired the steel in which
it was used. The court admitted the evidence to establish the meaning of the contract. Verdict-for the plaintiff for the contract price.
Templeton, for Plaintiff.
Heller, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Reamer, J. The sole question here is whether the custom or
usage in the trade as to the meaning of certain words, namelyfreedom from tin - is admissible to establish the meaning of the
contract. The parties here are engaged in a particular trade, the
steel industry, the plaintiff, manufacturing powder used in making
steel and the defendant, manufacturing steel. In connection with
many businesses and trades, particular words and expressions have
by usage acquired a meaning different from their plain, ordinary, popular meaning, in other words, have acquired a trade meaning. In
the case at bar it is alleged by the plaintiff that this is the case with
the expression "freedom from tin," and thus there is an ambiguity,
the words being susceptible of two meanings, the ordinary, popular
meaning and the trade meaning, which is that by the stipulation
against tin was not meant absolute freedom from tin, but only freedom from so much tin as impaired the quality of the steel in which
it was used. To establish this trade meaning, evidence was admitted
by the lower court, and we think properly so, after it is shown that
the particular custom or usage exists in the trade. This was held in
Roylance Co. vs. Descalzi, 243 Pa. 180, "Where a word with a special
meaning or a trade phrase appears itt a contract, it is competent, if
justice so requires, to introduce evidence to show the real sense in
which the words were used, or that they have a generally known fixed
trade significance."
Nor is the admission of the evidence a violation of the parol evidence rule against the admission of parol evidence to vary the terms
of a written contract. This was so held in Electric Reduction Co. vs.
Colonial Steel Co., 276 Pa. 181 (in which the facts were closely similar to those in the case at bar), stating, "The parol evidence rule does
not apply in its ordinary strictness where the existence of a custom or
usage to explain the meaning of words in a writing is concerned."
Such evidence is admitted on the ground that the law makes the
custom part of the contract, as stated in 27 Ruling Case Law, page
169, "The primary purpose in permitting parol evidence of a custom
to be introduced when the construction of a written contract is in-
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volved is to enable the court to arrive at the real meaning and intention of the parties, where this cannot be ascertained by the terms
of the contract."
The argument of counsel for defendant is largely based on the
assumption that the evidence to show the meaning of the words,
"freedom from tin" was admitted by the lower court without it first
having been established by the plaintiff that a definite custom or
usage existed, which we feel is an unwarranted assumption by counsel for the defendant from the facts as stated. If there were a conflict as to the existence of this usage or custom that was for the jury,
Electric Reduction Co. vs. Colonial Steel Co., supra, and from the
facts we take it that there was either no conflict as to this, or if there
were, its existence was established at the trial to the satisfaction of
the court.
Our conclusion is that in the case at bar parol evidence was
properly admitted to show the trade meaning of the words in dispute. .We, therefore, remit the case to the learned court below and
affirm its judgment.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A contract is expressed in words. Whether these words are
written or oral their meaning has to be ascertained. Only usage
gives them their meaning. But a survey of the English Dictionary
indicates that but few of them are invariably used in the same sense.
In talking or writing of one topic a word will have a sense quite distinguishable from that which it bears when another subject is the
theme.
It may be shown that "thousand" means, in a certain contract,
1,200 Cf. Greenleaf's Evid., 16th Ed., p. 408. "Free from tin, copper
or other impurities" might easily be used for such quantities of copper, or tin, as would be, for the uses in contemplation, an "impurity."
A certain substance might easily in one quantity be an impurity and
not so, in another.
We regard the Electric Reduction Co. vs. Colonial Steel Co.,
276 Pa. 181, sufficient justification for the admission of the evidence
as to the meaning of the terms used.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
FULMER VS. GREEN
Judgments - Rule to Strike Off 'Warrantof Attorney Act of
February 24- 1806-Myers & Jolly vs. Freiling, 81 Super. 117

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Green employed Fulmer to find a buyer for his land, or any part
of it, not less than 50 acres at $25 per acre. Fulmer was to get a com-
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mission of $3 per acre for the part sold. There was a warrant of attorney authorizing the prothonotary to confess judgment. Fulmer
filed with the agreement an affidavit that he had sold 60 acres, and
that he wa' therefore entitled to a commission of $180. The prothonotary entered judgment for that sum. Green made a motion to strike
off the judgment.
Uman, for Plaintiff.
Ward, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Stoner, J. The judgment in this case was entered under the Act
of Feb. 24, 1806 (4 Small's Laws 270, 278, sec. 28) which provides in
part "It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record
within this Commonwealth, on the application of any person being
the original holder (or assignee of such holder), of a note, bohd, or
other instrument of writing in which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant of attorney-at-law or other person to confess judgment, to enter judgment against the person or persons who executed
the same, for the amount which, from the face of the instrument, may
appear to be due without agency of attorney, or declaration filed."
The question then arises whether the instrument in question complies with this act. If it does, then motion to strike off should not be
granted. For if a judgment is regular upon its face it can only be
set aside in case of fraud or forgery. Otherwise proper procedure
would be to have judgment opened, Humphreys vs. Rawn, 8 Watts 78;
School District vs. Moyer, 20 Dist. 941.
The attorney for the plaintiff contends that the judgment is prima
facie proof of the right to recover. To support his contention he refers to Dalton vs. Willingmyre. 60 Super. 225 and Latrobe vs. Fritz
152 Pa. 224.
These cases, however, do not express the law when the
instrument is void on its face.
Many cases can be cited to support an entry of judgment in instances of lease, bailment, etc., but in all these cases the maximum
amount for which the judgment can be entered may be ascertained
from the face of the instrument. In the case at bar the maximum
amount for which a judgment can be entered can not be ascertained
from the face of the instrument. The minimum due can be found
from multiplying 50 acres by three dollars per acre commission. But
even in entering judgment for the minimum amount reference would
have to be made to outside evidence. There is nothing here to prevent Fulmer from claiming that he sold 1000 acres.
We see no difference between this case and that of Connay vs.
Halstead, 73 Pa. 354. In that case the price per acre was definite as
in the case at bar. There, however, in order to find the number of
acres, reference had to be made to outside evidence in the form of a
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report of a survey. Here the number of acres must be found by ref-erence to the affidavit of the seller. This court cannot see any difference in the two cases. Both depended upon outside evidence to de-termine the amount of the judgment. The court in the case referred
to said the judgment was plainly outside the Act of 1806 and would
therefore -be struck off.
A still later case, Meyers and Jolly vs. Frieberg, 81 Super. 117
involves almost the exact facts as the case before us. In that case
there was to be a commission paid for the sale of real estate. The
amount of the commission was to be contingent upon the price secured for the property, but not less than $10. The commission was to be
payable as soon as agreement was made to sell place. There was a
warrant of attorney to confess judgment for the amount of the commission. The plaintiff filed an affidavit that he sold it for $2,500 and
claimed a commission of $250 as one of the sums mentioned in the
warrant of attorney. Here the court held that it was not within the
power of the prothonotary to enter judgment because the amount due
could not be ascertained from the face of the instrument but reference would have to be made to the affidavit of the plaintiff. In that
case the amount was no more indefinite than in the case before us.
In view of the decisions of the courts of this state, we feel that
the prothonotary had no authority to enter judgment in this case under the Act of 1806, and that the judgment entered by the prothono-tary should be struck off.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The reason given for the striking off of the judgment by the
learned court below are entirely satisfactory. Affirmed.

NEWTON VS. HANCOCK
Husband and Wife - Married Women as Accommodation Maker
for Husband's Benefit-Promissory Note of Wife Void and Not
a Payment of Debt - Newhall vs. Arnett, 279 Pa. 317 Cited
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Hancock had been a partner with Newton. The firm was
dissolved and he was found indebted to Newton to the extent of
$2,500. Newton agreed to accept a note for that amount from Hancock's wife. This is assumpsit on the note. Defence: coverture.
Baker, for Plaintiff.
Berman. for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Kiel. J. In the case at the bar the plaintiff had no interest in the
partnership at all and owed it nothing. The debt of $2,500 was the
debt of her husband, and a married woman is not permitted by statute to obligate herself. The statute in substance is as follows: She
(a married woman) may not become an accommodation endorser,
maker, guarantor, or surety for another." Section two, Act of June
8, 1893. P. L. 344. She is incapable of becoming an accommodation
maker, which is the identical thing that she has attempted to do in
this case.
The case of Newhall vs. Arnett, 279 Pa. 317, contains the same
facts as the case at bar. It was held that the wife was not held liable
on the note, because of coverture. The plaiptiff's contention that the
note operated as payment of the husband's debt is untenable. A debt
is not paid by giving of a note therefor, whether it is that of a debtor
or of a third party, unless there is a stipulation to that effect, McCartney vs. Kipp, 171 Pa. 644; Dougherty vs. Bash, 167 Pa. 429. In
the case at bar there is no stipulation releasing the husband from
the indebtedness or of assigning the claim against him to her. It is
not necessary to decide the effect of such a release or assignment.
The debt remained that of the husband secured by the wife's note, and
so long as the latter remained an executory obligation it was open to
a defence of coverture.
A wife may pay her husband's debts, Scott vs. Bedell, 269 Pa. 167,
and may use borrowed money for that purpose, Yeany vs. Shannon,
256 Pa. 137. A mere agreement to pay his debt is not payment, nor
enforceable against her. It therefore follows that her note is without consideration to her and an assumption of the debt of another
who remained primarily liable, and had all the characteristics of an
accommodation note of which she was the maker, and which she has
has no power under the statute.
In view of the foregoing conclusions, and statements of law, we
give the judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The decision of the learned court below must be approved, Newhall vs. Arnett, 279 Pa. 317. Affirmed.

Will

-

CHARLES VS. HIGGINS
Power of Appointment - Exercise of Power - Rule Against
Perpetuities Violated - Crolius vs. Kramer, 279
Pa. 275, Cited

STATEMENT OF FACTS
X devised his land to a trustee, to pay the income to his son
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Henry for life; then to such persons as Henry should by will appoint.
Henry made a will in which, in execution of the power to appoint, he
directed his executor to pay the income to his son Charles for life,
and after his death the income to be paid to Charles' son for life,
and after his death to convey the land to his children in fee. Charles
insists that as heir-at--law he is entitled to the land in fee. He has
contracted to sell it to Higgins for $10,000, who questions his title.
Geistwhite, for Plaintiff.
Gottleib, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Gunnett, J. The question which must be determined in this case
is whether or not the execution of the power to appoint by Henry
violates the rule against perpetuities.
If the rule is violated in this case it logically follows that Charles
the son of Henry has a fee simple estate in the land, and can therefore convey a good title to Higgins.
After due consideration of the authorities on this point and the
briefs of counsel, we have decided that the attempted exercise of the
power of appointment by Henry violates the rule.
The fee simple to the land in question does not vest within the
time fixed by the rule, namely a life or lives in being and twenty one
years thereafter.
Within the rule against perpetuities a power of appointment to
be exercised only by will is not a general power, Lawrence Est., 136
Pa. 355. The power here can be exercised by Henry only by will and
not by deed, therefore it is a special power within the meaning of the
rule and in determining the validity of limitations created by the exercise of a special power, as being within or without the rule, the
time allowed by the rule is computed from the time of the creation
of the power and not from its exercise, Tiffany on Real Property,
page 647.
In Thellusson vs. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227, cited by counsel for the
defendant it clearly appears that the lives involved in the case were
all in being at the time of the testator's death, while in the case at
bar it is obvious that X did not live to have great-great--grandchildren.
We therefore decide that Charles has the fee simple to the land
in question and the defendant Higgins has no good reason to question his title. Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The gift to the son Harry for life, is unimpeachable. The next
gift was to Henry's testamentary appointee. That appointment was
in Henry's life, and Henry was in being when the testator died. The
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gift to Henry's son Charles for life was therefore made in a life in

being, at X's death, (or within 21 years after). But the remainder
after the life estate to Charles, was appointed by Charles. This des-ignation did not occur during the life of X, or during lives then in
being or 21 years thereafter. Charles' will would not take effect till
his death. It does not appear that Charles was in life, when his
grandfather died. Any gift from him, by appointment, would not
occur then, within a life in being, when X died, or 21 years thereafter.
But the learned court below has assumed that Charles would
have been the only heir of his grandfather, had the latter died intestate. If he would have been, the power of appointment by Charles
being invalid, X could have died intestate as to all interests subsequent to Charles' life estate. Charles would have, then, such interests by inheritance. He would be able to convey a fee to the defendant, and, on tender of a deed to Higgins, would have a right to recover the $10,000. Cf. Crolius vs. Kramer, 279 Pa. 275. Affirmed.
HAMMOND VS. JEWELL
Constitutional Law - Creation and Extension of Liens
Lien Act, May 6, 1915, P. L. 261

-

Attorney's

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hammond, an attorney, brought an action for his client Hol-lister. He was superseded after working on the case for some months
by the appointment of Jewell as attorney. Jewell conducted the suit
to judgment and collected $3000 from the defendant. Hammond
sues out a rule on Jewell to show cause why he should not pay Hammond $250 for his services. Court refused the rule.
Best, for Plaintiff.
Allmond, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Whitten, J. This case is appealed for lower court's refusal to
grant a rule. Therefore the main question would appear to-be whether or not the rule should have been granted. We believe the lower
court to be in conformity with the present law in refusing the rule.
The most flagrant error is in the attempt to use a rule to show cause
as an original process. Certainly such procedure is a"great error. We
cite Volume VI Troubat and Haley's Practice, page 3451, paragraph
14, "A rule cannot be used as an original process but is used primarily
for facilitating jurisdiction already acquired."
That such a regulation is founded upon good reason is amply
proven by Bassinger vs. Wernwag, 8 D. R. 263 and Barber vs. Standard Sewer Pipe Co., 5 C. C. 293. In the first case there is a citation
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of Justice Mitchell as follows: "Before court can grant or enforce a
rule against any party it must have jurisdiction over him by some
regular and recognized legal process. And in the second case, Justice Furst in making the decision says, "If it is sought to hold an individual liable * * * it must be done by appropriate action begun
by a writ of summons or of scire facias or by a bill in equity ,so that
he may have an opportunity to appear and defend and have an opportunity also to make his defence before a jury or tribunal having power to hear, try and dispose of the case and enter judgment thereon
according to right and justice. Anything short of this is not due process of law without the meaning of the fundamental law of this
commonwealth."
Therefore, in view of the above authorities and, despite the arguments of the counsel on other points which we have not considered
because of the greater relevency of the point discussed above, we
uphold the action of the lower court and affirm their refusal to grant
the rule.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The method by which an attorney recovered compensation for his
services, when he had no lien on papers by which to coerce payment,
and when he had no money belonging to his client, against which he
could set off his claim, paying over to the client only the balance, was
to sue the client at law, obtain a verdict of a jury, and a judgment
thereon. The Attorney's Lien Act of May 6, 1915, P. L. 261, gave a
lien on the cause of action and the proceeds, in whatsoever hands.
The Act authorizes the court in which the cause is brought, on the
petition of the attorney, to enforce the lien. If this Act were valid,
it would doubtless give a lien on the $3,000, which could be enforced
by order of the court, that the superceding attorney, in whose hands
the money is, pay over the compensation of $250 to the discharged
attorney.
But, for reasons stated in Laplacca vs. Phila. R. T. Co., 265 Pa.
304, this act is held unconstitutional and void. The only remedy of
the plaintiff is an action against his client and a trial by jury.
For reasons other than those stated in the opinion of the court
below, its decision is affirmed.
N. B -The brief of Mr. Best cites two cases from 266 Pa. 428 and
266 Pa. 112, which 'have, and can be conceived to have, no relevancy.
They do not garnish the argument.
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BOOK REVIEW
FAMOUS AMERICAN JURY SPEECHES. By Frederick C. Hicks. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1925. vii and
1181 pp.
This volume contains twenty-four of the foremost examples of courtroom oratory delivered in the past forty
years in various parts of the United States.
Among the best known orators whose speeches are
included in the book are Joseph H. Choate, Robert G. Ingersoll, Senator William E. Borah, Clarence S. Darrow, and
Robert E. Crowe.
The compiler has made a wise selection for his book
from the many eloquent speeches which lawyers have delivered in recent times. The interruptions of the opposing
counsel as well as those of court are retained thus adding
a touch of realism to otherwise prosaic reading.
The speeches are given almost in their entirety which
has made the book rather voluminous and at times very
tiresome. It contains, however, much of value to the true
student of the forensic art-both undergraduate and graduate.
HAROLD S. IRWIN.

BOOK REVIEW
CASES ON BUSINESS LAW. By Bauer and Dillayou. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1925. pp. xxii, 1044.
An earlier volume of Cases on Business Law prepared
by Britton and Bauer covered Contracts, Agency, Negotiable Instruments, Sales, Partnership and Corporations.
Professor Bauer and a new associate now present in one
book a collection of case books on Bailments and Carriers,
Security Rights, Property, Insurance, Banks and Banking,
Bankruptcy, Crimes and Trade Regulation. Aside from
such subjects as Practice and Procedure, Evidence, Consti-
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tutional Law, Decedents' Estates, Trusts, Equity, and Domestic Relations, we now have in these two volumes condensed collections of cases discussing fundamental principles in almost all the subjects studied in our law schools.
The book is of the same size and type as the case books in
the American Case Book Series. Of course no attempt is
made to report the leading cases or trace the development
of a principle. Compactness must preclude this. The editors have attempted to select "a good, illustrative case,
fairly recent, vibrant with the interesting life of the country, and often of the decade, in which we now live." A
practical book for commerce students has been the aim.
Many sections of the book are preceded by short introductory paragraphs calculated to arouse interest in the cases
following. Provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, the Federal Bankruptcy Act and other important acts
are set out in black faced type.
In his interesting review of this book in the January
issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professor Nathan Isaacs of the Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration notes the deficiencies of the book,
if the student is to learn the functions and best uses of
the business devices available to accomplish various purposes in business transactions. "Perhaps a good deal of
research outside of law books will be necessary before these
more vital matters can be presented in the classroom."
Much must be learned by the successful executive from observation and experience. The study of books will always
be a poor substitute for practice. But this book can be
commended as an excellent tool for use in teaching the elementary principles of many subjects.

